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One school of thought that defined an independent paradigm
in economics is known as the post-Keynesian School (Eichner and
Kregel (1975)). It concentrates almost exclusively on developed
capitalist economies and all of its main propositions have been
tested in that milieu. The question to be answered in this pa-
per is: do post-Keynesian principles have any relevance for eco-
nomies other than developed capitalist ones, in particular those
economies usually labeled socialist or communist? This paper pro-
vides a simple test of the general applicabilityof post-Keyne-
sian theory by applying some of the main post-Keynesian princip-
les to the realities of contemporary socialist economies with
regard to growth, income, distribution, prices and money. By
socialist economies we understand here the Eastern-Europe type
without considering the otherwise very important question of the
)
true character of these economies and an adequate. name for them.
2. Causes of Growth
The key role of investment in determining the level and
rate of growth in economic activity was supported by J •.M. Keynes'
(1936) and Michael Kalecki's (1935) thesis that investments are
a relatively independent variable. This tenet is fully incorpo-
rated in post-Keynesian theory which stresses that the invest-
ment determines savings and even themoney supply, rather than
the reverse. For, if the rate of investrnentis toincrease,
entrepreneurs rnust be confident enough of the future profita-
bility of their own investments in order to commit thernselves
1) After seeing an early draft of th~s paper, Alfred Eichner,
J.A. Kregel and John Cornwall encouraged me to engage in fur-
ther research and Philip Arestis has provided mewith detailed
comments. The J.F. Kennedy-Institut für Nordamerikastudien at
the Freie Universität, Berlin, supported rny one-month stay
there for further research. I would like to thank thern all.
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to ownership and development of productive facilities (Asima-
kopulos (1986), p. 79). Savings adjust to increased investment
activities as a result of both the multiplier and income dis-
tribution effects of changes in investment. The banking system
accomodates credit and money supply to the manifest prospects
of investment and thus plays an important but still consequen-
tial role in the investment process.
In other words, entrepreneurs' expectations aoouE fuf'ure-·
profitability, which are inevitably influenced by political and
psychological factors in addition to cornrnercial ones, are the
sole cause of investment. This approach is clearly related to
capitalist economies where an independent social group exists
that receives profits from property ownership and entrepreneu-
rial activities and decides on their use. Does this approach have
any relevance for socialist economies? Since in sociälist econo-
mies there is no separate group of people.owning capital and re-
ceiving profits, this question may seem unexpected. However, it
will be argued here that this is a meaningful one, possibly with
an affirmative answer.
If we accept that inconEemporary socTali·st--cc>untries there
exists a social group or elite comprising of the highest party
and government officials, who make all major decisions concer-
ning the economy including those on the share of investment in
social product, the motivation and behavior of this group is
of central importance. Keynes (1936) argued that the investment
behavior of a capitalist class was ultimately governed by "ani-
mal instincts". The same type of behavior of a socialist elite
depends mainly on something that could be called "ideological
instincts". This term seems appropriate, because the share of
investment in social product in a socialist economy does not de-
pend on the personal consumer aspirations of the decision-making
elite (the history of socialism documentsthat it is an indepen-
dent, exogenously determined variable). The share of investment
in a socialist economy depends mainly on the ideological strength
and theoretical orthodoxy ofthe elite (which ia itself influ-
enced by the achieved level ofeconomic and sociaL development) •
.I
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Stalin's regime was obviously not only theoretically orthodox
and dogmatic, but also very strict in limiting the consumption
of the majority of the population in order to achieve "accele-
rated industrialization". The same could be said of the Stali-
nist regimes in Eastern Europe in the fifties, Mao's China, Pol
Pot's Cambodia etc. On the other hand, socialist leaders or eli-
tes who to a certain degree pursued a course of political libe-
ralization and therefore were usually accused of "revisionism",
were inclined to distribute the social productbetween consump-
tion and investment in a more balanced way. Representative examp-
les are contemporary Hungary, China and especially Yugoslavia
whose politically quite unorthodox leader(s) in the last two
decades almost reached the opposite extreme in the division
of the social product. A relatively high standard of living in
Yugoslavia together with a relatively low income per capita
were only possible on the basis of mainly external investment
(foreign credit) which recently led to the problems of a huge
foreign debt, stagnation, nearly 100-percent annual inflation
and a sharp decline in real wages.
Having in mind nineteenth century European capitalism,
Keynes (1971, p. 11-13) wrote:
"Thus this remarkable system depended for itsgrowth on
a double bluff or deception. On the one hand, the labou-
ring classes accepted from ignorance or powerlessness, or
were compelled, persuaded or cajoled by custom, convention,
authority and the well-established order of Society into
accepting a situation in which they could call their own
very little of the cake, that they and Nature and capitalist
classes were co-operating to produce. And on the other hand,
the capitalist classes were allowed to call the best part
of the cake theirs and were theoretically free to consume
it, on the tacit underlying condition that they consumed
very little of it in practice. The duty of "saving" became
ninetenth of a virtue and the growth of the cake the ob-
ject of a true religion .
.•• I seek only to point out that the principles of accu-
mulation based on inequality was a vital part of the pre-
war order of society and of progress as we then understood
it, and to emphasize that this principle depended on un-
stable psychological conditions, which it may be impossible
to recreate. It was not natural for a population, of whom
so few enjoyed the comforts of life, to accumulate so hgel~ß
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If we now re-read this extraordinary passage but think
of the twentieth-century Soviet Union instead of nineteenth-
century Europe and exchange the word "capitalist class" for
"socialist/communist elite", we will get an equally good ex-
planation of the necessary conditions for growth of the so-
cialist economy. Huge accumulation and d.iminishing. consumption
of the majority of the population are, and always were, the
two unseparable and inevitable aspects of the industrialization
process. This was very well recognized by Preobrazenski (1926,
ch. II) in his formulation of the law of "socialist primitive
accumulation" which revealed the "bluff or. deception", as Keynes
would say, of the"fast industrialization"period in the USSR.
In conclusion, economic history documents.very well the
thesis that the rate of growth of industrializing economies
depends mainly on the behavior of the (narrow) social elite who
monopolizes saving-investment decisions. The origin, structure
and political persuasions of different social elites governing
the process of growth are of great .. but.; strictly economically,
secondary importance. What is of primary.importance is their
comparative efficiency, i.e. the velocity andstabi.lity of
growth they induce.
It should be noted here that investmentsobviously are
not the only factor of growth, although probably the most im-
portant one. Research on the influence and significance of other
factors of growth in socialism, especially. the neglected ones
such as organizational factors (the so-called "~efficiency"),
would be.an important undertaking. However, they were not con-
sidered here since the originalityof post-Keynesian, theory com-
pared to traditional neoclassical theory lies mainly in the ex-
planation of the rate of investment as.a factor of growth.
3. Instability of Growth
Harrod (1939) proved that wheneverinvestment. decisions are
carried out not by a single but by a number of individuals or
institutions a potential instability of growth exists, since an
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aggregate of independent individual investments in an economy
is not necessarily equal to the total level of investment needed
for the stable ("guaranteed", as Harrod would say) rate of
growth. This statement is incorporated in the post-Keynesian
explanation of the causes of growth instability in (liberal)
capitalism where uncorrelated individual decisions on investment
can hardly be expected to reach the necessary aggregate level
of investment in the economy (Cornwall (1979), p. 20).
But what about investment in socialist economies? In prin-
ciple, the decisions on the share of investment in net social
product should be taken by the state planning authority. But
a completely centrally planned economy is an abstract. concept,
although some socialist economies at certain periods were approach-
ing it in reality (the USSR in the thirties, China in Mao's
era, etc.). The latest direction of institutional change in.Eastern
Europe, however, documents that the decision on the share of in-
....
vestment does not take place at only one level of industrial ma-
nagement even in the most centralized economies. This is even
truerfor those socialist countries that allow for more decen-
tralization and market mechanisms. In Yugoslavia, for example,
the total share of investment is formed as an aggregate of a num-
ber of relatively independent decisions on. investment on the com-
pany level ( strongly influenced by the local bank, as weIl as
government and party authorities). The sum cf individual firmst
investments in )Ugoslavia, together with private investment in
agriculture and small business, however, does not necessarily
reach the aggregate level of investment needed for stable growth.
This is very weIl documented by the instability of growth in Yu-
goslavia and the lacking capability of central planning organs
to achieve fulfilment of their predictions in the form of five
year plans (Horvat (1976), p. 42-48).
Thus the leaders of all socialist economies are confronted
with a Faustian dilemma: either they centralize investment deci-
sions making in order to achieve stable growth but elimi-
nate incentives on the lower levels of the economic structure
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and hence threaten growth, or they decentralize decisions on
investment in order t6 increase efficiency and growth but risk
disproportionality of macro-economic variables and hence threaten
the stability of growth. The latest direction of institutional
change in Eastern Europe shows that the second threat to growth
is consideredthe less dangerous one. The relevance of post-
Keynesian propositions is now immediately evident, since the
consequences of decentralized decision making on investment are
a post-Keynesian topic par excellence. The fact that individuals
who take these decisions are not private owners and recipients
of profits but representatives of state-owned firms, or even
local party officials, does not change the substance of the fun-
damental growth problem: who or what guarantees that partial in-
vestment decisions needed to offer incentives reach exactly the
necessary aggregate level? Mechanisms and institutions coordina-
ting decentralized investments are quite different in socialist
and capitalist economies but, nevertheless, perform the same eco-
nomic task.
4. Income Distribution
A distinguishing characteristic of post-Keynesian theory
is that the distribution of income is considered integral to the
explanation of economic activity (Eichner and Kregel (1975),
p. 1296) in a sense that the control over the rate of investment
implies control over the distribution ofincome and the rate
of profit (Pasinetti (1974), p. 113). Classical economists
assumed a twofold class structure (workers. and. capitalists) ..
and profits as the only source of investment.The simple post-
Keynesian model based on these assumptions shows that a higher
growth rate, given the same production techniques and money
wage rate, means redistribution of income favoring profits at
the expense of wages. If we allow for savings out of wages but
also assume that the propensity to save outof profits is greater
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than that out of wages, the assumption of a twofold class struc-
ture is shaken, but the main post-Keynesian hypothesis, as was
~
shown by Kaldor (1956), still holds. In this case,~larger saving-
investment share in profits (at the expense of consumption) today
still means a larger profit share in national income (at the ex-
pense of wages) tomorrow. This is because of what lies behind the
post-Keynesian delineation of income shares is not so much a dis-
tinction between social classes, as the distinctionbetween quasi-
contractual and residual forms of income (Kregel (1973), eh. 11).
It is precisely this insistence on different forms of income, which
does not have to correspond to the separate classes·of population,
that allows the generalization of the post-Keynesian statement
on income distribution to include countries other than capitalist
ones. This was already remarked by Eichner and Kregel (1975. p.1299)
although they do not seem to have elaborated on it any further:
"Indeed these conclusions (on the irrelevance of wor-
kers'savings for the functional distribution on quasi-
contractual and residual forms of income - N.J.) apply
to any economic system in which some one group, private
and public, receives a residual ~pending on the
level of economic activities - and it is hard to conceive
of any economic system without that characteristic."
In socialism, nobody receives a residual share. However, it
has already been argued here that there is a social group that
completely controls this residual share, which in the economic,
but not juridical,sense of the word amounts to the same thing.
Therefore, the fundamental classical and post-Keynesian conten-
tion that the necessary condition for larger future profits
(accumulation) is current redistribution from consumption to
saving/investment and from quasi-contractual to residual forms
of income, holds for both capitalism and socialism. Due to enor-"
mous institutional differences, however, policies of growth and
distribution are faced with different problems in the two systems.
This could be documented by the classical problem of controlling
aggregate demand.
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Alot of evidence has lately been provided t6 show that cre-
dit and monetary policy is not sufficient for controlling demand
and maintaining stable growth and high employment in developed
capitalist countries (Cornwall (1983), ch. 12). For quite speci-
fic reasons this kind of policy is not efficient enough in socia-
list countries either. As is weIl known, in capitalism even the
quasi-contractual forms of income, such as wages, could contain
possible surpluseswhich could be saved, invested and returned
to the wage earner in the form of profit. Such a possibility does
not exist in socialism. Since they cannot invest their possible
surpluses, workers in socialism are inclined to consume them com-
pletely and immediately. Hence, those surpluses have a much more
direct and complete influence on aggregate demand in socialism than
in capitalism. Empirical evidence for this statement is the pheno-
menon of demand, which is almost always larger than supply, as
manifested in the famous shortages that are a common and constant
feature of socialist economies (Kornai (1980». A restrictive
credit-monetary policy in those circumstances is of even less help
than in capitalism, and a socialist state is forced to implement
more direct policy measures, such as full control of prices and
wages. In other words, every unplanned increase in the quasi-con-
tractual forms of income, i.e. the increase of the real wage, is
a greater threat to the stability of the socialist_than of the ca-
pitalist economy, precisely to the extent that the propensity to
save (and invest) out of wages is greater in the latter than in
the former system. The ideological limit in the form of prohibi-
tion of any private investment has as its necessary consequence
either the need to keep real wages always near existential needs
(in "real socialism") or an incapability of controlling aggregate
demand and hence inflation (in more decentralized countries with
real wages not always under full control, as in Yugoslavia) •
It should be noted here that the problem of optimal invest-
ment and consumption shares during the growth process is also
dealtwith in neoclassical literature (so-called "optimal growth
paths"). The results of that approach, however, can hardly be
compared to those achieved in a post-Keynesian analysis, since the
- 9 -
two theoretical traditions sharply differ in their initial
assumptions, tools of analysis and view of economic reality
in general.
5. Dual Character of the Economy
Post-Keynesian theory argues that the econornies of developed
capitalist countries consist of two different sectors - a cor-
porative and a competitive one. The theory. concentrates on the
mark-up procedure by which prices are either dictated or nego-
tiated in the dominant corporate sector (Kenyon (1979». Since the
whole socialist economy, or at least its dominant state sector,
can be viewed as a huge, very weIl integrated corporate sector,
USSR Ltd., as Nove (1978, p. 38) would say, the similarities with
the capitalist corporate sector, as described by the post-Keynesian
authors, are numerous: 1) in both sectors, prices reflect "mark-up
over prime costs" where the height of the mark-up depends on the
plans of those controlling the sector ; 2) .. both sectors try to
gain full control over prime costs (primarily raw materials and
wages) by subordinating the raw material producers and by the
control of real wagesi 3) in both sectorsprices are fixed at the
level needed to finance planned investment expenditures; 4) both
secto:r:s are characterized by "administrative competition" (Nove
(1978), p. 36) over thedistribution of available resources; 5)
in both sectors the response to a change in demand for the sec-
tor's products is a changeof output and not of prices; 6) the
main goal of governing grops~.in both sectors isstable growth
over a long period, and all variables of the system (prices, in-
come distribution etc.)are accomodated to servethis purpose.
All of these similarities, needless to say, are realized in diffe-
rent institutional arrangements and show up in different forms,
but they are still based on the sameeconomic content. The expla-
nation for these important similaritiescan be found in the fact
that both systems belong to the higher stages of development of
the industrial mode of production whose technology and. organiza-
tion of production force leading s6cial groups, no matter what
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their name is, what origin they have or political philosophy
they follow, to provide answers to the same economic problems.
The political and institutional differences, otherwise very
important, are just of secondary importance here.
Although much better integrated than its capitalist counter-
part, the state/corporate sector of contemporary socialist eco-
nomies is not uniform. Deeper insights into the structure of
"real socialist" economies provide evidence of the fact that the
level of state controlis not the same in all sectors of the eco-
nomy, especially. since the economic reforms of the sixties (Jan-
kov (1981), p. 494; Bunic (1980), p. 164; Savcneko i Jeremcuk
(1978), p. 50). It varies according to the central planners' opi-
nions on the economic and social importance and priority of a par-
ticular sector. A steel mill in Eastern Europe would hardly have
any problem withinvestment financing, but would hardly expect
any freedom concerning product prices and product buyers either.
The same does not always follow for a textile or furniture firm
where the freedom for business moves is greater and a skillful
manager (commercially oriented or with good political "connec-
tions") disposes of more diversified ways of promoting the firm's
interests.
The existence of at least two different subsectors inside
the state/corporate sector can be even better recognized in those
specific socialist countries that allow for more decentralization
and market. The dominant subsector is usually under more direct
control of the government, has a monopoly position in the market
and is characterized by self-investment or at least an absolute
priority in investment financing. Another.subsector,consisting
of "light" industries, services, together with private agricul-
ture and small-scale business, is much more exposed to market com-
petition, prices vary significantly and investments are generally
much less certain. A specific interplay of those two (sub)sectors
provides certain dynamics to the more decentralized socialist eco-
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nomies; but sometimes at the expense of the stability of growth
(as argued above) .
The existence of two different sectors within a socialist
economy, even not so clearly recognized as in capitalism, has
still one more important aspect. For a small and relatively open
(even a socialist) country, world prices, which,. according to
post-Keynesians, are formed by the interplay of the .corporate and
competitive sector on a world-scale, are given. They cannot be
significantly influenced from inside. This implies that the oil
and food industries, for example, will be in a different position
due to external factors, regardless of their internal characteris-
tics. Thus, one cannot neglect the influence of world prices and
the economic world order in general on internal matters of socia-
list economies.
Allof this supports the thesis that the phenomenon of a dual
character of the economy, stressed by the post-Keynesians, is rele-
vant for socialist economies. The interplay of two differently orga-
nized sectors in a socialist economy enables the governing eliteto
pursue more elastic and adaptable policies and allows for the concen-
tration of surpluses disposable for investment in those branches
which are considered as the most important and propulsive ones. Thus,
the dual character of socialist economies, although manifested in
institutional arrangements different from capitalist economies, con-
tributes to the same goal as it does in capitalism. Political and
institutional factors which differentiate these two systems can hard-
ly hide the similar economic substance they are based on.
6. Money and Credit
According to post-Keynesians, monetary authorities do not have
complete control over the supply of credit in the economy and, hence,
cannot effectively control aggregate spending. This is because the
supply of credit provided by the banks accomodates the demand for
credit created mainly by the dominant corporate sector. This endo-
genous theory of money, according to which the demand for investment
and credit creates its own supply and not vice versa, is explained by
specific relations and the interplay of interests between large cor-
porations on the one side, and commercial and central banks on the
other (Moore (1979».
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Recently, Gedeon (1985) has extended thisthesis by arguing
that t~ere could exist non-bank sources of credit inthe economy
such as issuing and transfering bills of exchange and failing to
meet debt obligations. Gedeon documents this thesis by a case study
of the Yugoslav economy (!) which is, it seems, a paradigmatic
example of an economy where the monetary authorities cannot control
the money supply or, as Bajt (1982) says, where an "autonomous
right of monetization" exists. Ujdenica (1983) has documented that
the growth of mutual crediting, in the form of debt issued by
buyers and accepted by seIlers and different kinds.of uncovered
claims, is strongly negatively correlated to a severely restric-
tive credit and monetary policy. In other words, confronted with
a restrietion of the money supply, firms simplycreated their
own "money". More than that, this endogenously created money is
not only widely accepted in mutual transactions between firms, but
also silently approved by monetary and state authorities!
The explanation for this lies in the specific characteristics
of the Yugoslav economic system which allows companies a certain
independence in the market (similar to capitalist economies) but,
in the end, protects illiquid firms from bankruptcy and secures the
basic right of employment and income, at least for those who already
work (similar to socialist economies). Thus, marketsocialism, of
which Yugoslavia is a representative exampIe, is confronted with
the almost incompatible goals of achieving macro-economic efficiency
in the case of socially-owned but market-dependent firms, and guaran-
teeing the right to work and income at least to those who are al-
ready employed. One of the possible (even temporary) ways out of
this paralyzing situation is to allow for an endogenously created
money in the economy which hides and postpones social conflicts
about
but bringsVenormous inflation and elements of a monetary chaos.
As Gedeon(1985 , p. 219) concludes:
"UltimateIy both the capitalist and the market-socialist
economies must deal with the question of who is ultimate-
Iy responsible for bank lending since in both economies
chronic inflation is explained by the inability or un-
willingness of monetary authorities or the state to pre-
vent rival claimants for limited social ressources from
creating money to realize their target expenditures."
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But Yugoslavia perhaps represents an exception among socialist
countries with respect to monetary issues, and the question of re-
levance of post-Keynesian endogenous theory of money and credit
for socialist economies in general still has be considered. The
main proposition of that theory, which says that money is rarely
a problem when there is a will to invest (at least in the dominant
corpo!ate _s~ctor), seems to hold for socialist economies also.
-- - -- -- - ~-
Planning authorities or governing groups who decide on the share
of investment also have full control over financial institutions
and, hence, money and credit. It is highly improbable that any
particular investment project incorporated in the overall plan
would be cancelled .. because of the lack of financial means alone.
The aggregate level of investment, however, depends mainly on the
"ideological instinct" of a narrow decision making elite (as
argued above). So, if we take "ideological instincts" as given,
they would. easily result in an adequate amount 0f financial
means for investment, similar to the way in which Keynesian "ani-
mal instincts" of the capitalist class usually effect the adequate
money supply.
In principle, governing groups in socialism have a much more
direct and efficient control over all elements of the economy and it
seems that a strict credit-monetary policy would be quite sufficient
a tool for controlling aggregate spending. But, in fact, this is
only true for investment-spending in the dominant state sector.
Other forms of spending, labor consumption above all, are not al-
ways under full control. It has already been argued in this paper
that eventual surpluses in wages (above what are considered to be
existential needs) are usually not saved but consumed. If in addi-
tion to this there consists a constant public pressure. for the ~n­
crease of real wages and also a conflict over thedistribution
of income between different groups of wage earners (which is usual-
ly resolved by an unplanned increa~_e in some nominal wages), a ty-
pical post-Keynesian problem arises. Post-Keynesians argue that
the conflict over the income distribution lies at the heart of in-
flation. What is needed in that situation is: "some binding politi-
cal accord among major economic groups in the system which outlines
the share of income each group is willing to accept (Eichner(1979),
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p. 182). The conflict over income distribution in socialism, although
not as visible as in capitalist democracies, is also resolved at the
expense of monetary equilibrium. The important difference, however,
is that this does not result in an increase of inflation (which offi-
cially does not exist), but in a way typical of socialist economies:
an increase of all kinds of shortages. For, if money supply and hence
demand are increased while prices are not allowed to adjust, shorta-
gesare a quite logical outcome.
In fact, the governing groups of soc:LaITsteconomies conscious-
ly decided that shortages were the less dangerous consequence (than
inflation or unemployment) of the same fundamental problemof all
industrial societies. Kornai (1979, p. 804) confirmed this when he
concluded that in socialism " ... Shortage plays a role similar to
the problem of unemployment in the description of capitalism."
Yugoslavia is obviously an exemption to this rule amongthe socialist
countries, since its governing elite provideda typical II capitalist ll
solution according to which inflation and unemployment are more
acceptable than shortages and unmotivation. But this only confirms
the view that there exists a fundamental problem common to all indus-
trialized societies, namely the problem of distribution of limited
social resources and income between rival social claimants which




An attempt to test the general validitiy of post-Keynesian
theory by applying a few of its main propositions to the realities
of contemporary socialist economies provided.results with affir-
mative answers. The problems of growth, income distribution, prices
and money in socialism could be approached on the basis of post-
Keynesian theory. The usefulness of this resultis of a twofold
nature. First, certain new and original insights in theway of ope~
ration of socialist economies could be achieved. Second, post-Key-
nesian theory showed a potential general applicability that makes
possible research on the industrial mode of production in all of
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